Many applications of automated deduction require reasoning modulo background theories, in particular some form of integer arithmetic. Developing corresponding automated reasoning systems that are also able to deal with quantified formulas has recently been an active area of research. We contribute to this line of research and propose a novel instantiation-based method for a large fragment of first-order logic with equality modulo a given complete background theory, such as linear integer arithmetic. The new calculus is an extension of the Model Evolution Calculus with Equality, a firstorder logic version of the propositional DPLL procedure, including its ordering-based redundancy criteria. We present a basic version of the calculus and prove it sound and (refutationally) complete under certain conditions.
Introduction
Many applications of automated deduction require reasoning modulo background theories, in particular some form of integer arithmetic. Older theory reasoning techniques developed within first-order theorem proving are often impractical as they require the enumeration of complete sets of theory unifiers (in particular those in the tradition of Stickel's Theory Resolution [14] ) or feature only weak or no redundancy criteria (e.g., Bürckert's Constraint Resolution [7] ). Developing sophisticated automated reasoning systems that are also able to deal with quantified formulas has recently been an active area of research [8, 10, 13, 4, 1] . We contribute to this line of research and propose a novel instantiation-based method for a large fragment of first-order logic with equality modulo a given complete background theory, such as linear integer arithmetic. The new calculus, ME E (T), is an extension of the Model Evolution calculus with equality [5] , a first-order logic version of the propositional DPLL procedure, including its ordering-based redundancy criteria as recently developed in [6] . At the same time, ME E (T) is a generalization wrt. these features of the earlier ME(LIA) calculus [4] .
Because instantiation based methods, including Model Evolution, have been shown to provide successful classical automated theorem proving methods we believe there is justification to develop theory-reasoning versions, even if the input logic or the decidability results are not new. Yet, we think ME E (T) is relevant through its combination of powerful techniques for first-order equational logic with equality, based on an adaptation of the Bachmair-Ganzinger theory of superposition, with a black-box theory reasoner, which greatly enhances its versatility. ME E (T) is thus similarly positioned as the hierarchic superposition calculus [1, 3] .
Another angle to look at ME E (T) is from SMT-solving: Over the last years, Satisfiability Modulo Theories has become a major paradigm for theorem proving modulo background theories. In one of its main approaches, DPLL(T ), a DPLL-style SAT-solver is combined with a decision procedure for the quantifier-free fragment of the background theory T [11] . DPLL(T ) is essentially limited to the ground case and resorts to incomplete or inefficient heuristics to deal with quantified formulas [9, e.g.] . In fact, addressing this intrinsic limitation by lifting DPLL(T ) to the first-order level is one of the main motivations for the ME E (T) calculus (much like Model Evolution was motivated by the goal of lifting the propositional DPLL procedure to the first-order level while preserving its good properties).
One possible application of ME E (T) is for finite model reasoning. For example, the three formulas 1 ≤ a ≤ 100, P(a) and ¬P(x) ← 1 ≤ x ∧ x ≤ 100 together are unsatisfiable because the interval declaration 1 ≤ a ≤ 100 for the constant a together with the unit clause P(a) permit only models that satisfy one of P(1), . . . , P(100). Such models however falsify the third formula. Finite model finders, e.g., need about 100 steps to refute the clause set, one for each possible value of a.
Our ME E (T) calculus, on the other hand, can reason directly with integer intervals and allows a refutation in O(1) steps. See Section 7 for further discussion of how this is achieved, variatons of the example, and considerations on ME E (T) as a decision procedure.
The perhaps most promising application area is within software verification. Quite frequently, proof obligations arise that require quantified formulas to define data structures with specific properties, e.g., ordered lists or ordered arrays, and to prove that these properties are preserved under certain operations, e.g., when an element is inserted at an appropriate position. In the array case, one could define ordered arrays via "for all i, j with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ m it holds a[i] < a [ j] " , where i and j are variables and m is a parameter, all integer-valued. Our calculus natively supports parameters like m and is well suitable for reasoning with integer variables that are bounded, like i and j. In general, parameters like m must be additionally constrained to a finite domain for the calculus to be effective, see again Section 7.
The general idea behind our calculus wrt. theory reasoning is to use ("rigid") variables to represent individual, yet at the current time unknown background domain elements, and instantiate these as needed to drive a derivation. As a simple example without parameters, consider the clauses f (x) ≈ g(x) ← x > 5 and ¬( f ( y + y) ≈ g (8) ). These clauses will be refuted, essentially, by checking satisfiability of the set {v 1 = v 2 + v 2 , v 1 > 5, v 1 = 8} of constraints over rigid variables and (ordered) paramodulation inferences for reasoning with the equations in these clauses.
Preliminaries
We work in the context of standard many-sorted logic with first-order signatures comprised of sorts and operators (i.e., function symbols and predicate symbols) of given arities over these sorts. We rely on the usual notions of structure, (well-sorted) term/formula, satisfiability, and so on. If Σ is a sorted signature and X a set of sorted variables we will call Σ(X )-term (resp. -formula) a well-sorted term (resp. formula) built with symbols from Σ and variables from X . The notation Σ(X 1 , X 2 ) is a shorthand for Σ(X 1 ∪ X 2 ).
Syntax. For simplicity, we consider here only signatures with at most two sorts: a background sort B and a foreground sort F. We assume a background signature Σ B having B as the only sort and an at most countable set of operators that includes an (infix) equality predicate symbol = of arity B × B. We will write s = t as an abbreviation of ¬(s = t). We fix an infinite set X B of B-variables, variables of sort B.
We assume a first-order background theory T of signature Σ B all of whose models interpret = as the identity relation. Since T is complete, with no loss of generality we specify it simply as a Σ B -structure. We call the set |B| that T associates to the sort B the background domain. We assume, again with no loss of generality, that |B| is at most countably infinite and all of its elements are included in Σ as B-constant symbols. 1 Our running example for T will be the theory of linear integer arithmetic (LIA). For that example, Σ B 's operators are ≤, + and all the integer constants, all with the expected arities, T is the structure of the integer numbers with those operators, and |B| = {0, ±1, ±2, . . .}.
We will consider formulas over an expanded signature Σ Π B and expanded set of variables X B ∪ V where Σ Π B is obtained by adding to Σ B an infinite set Π of parameters, free constants of sort B, and V is a set of B-variables not in X B , which we call rigid variables. When we say just "variable" we will always mean a variable in X , not a rigid variable. The function and predicate symbols of Σ domain element, and will be introduced during proof search similarly to rigid variables in free-variable tableaux calculi. In contrast, parameters will be free constants in input formulas, standing for arbitrary domain values.
The full signature Σ for our calculus is obtained by adding to Σ Π B the foreground sort F, function symbols of given arities over B and F, and one infix equality predicate symbol, ≈, of arity F × F. The new function symbols and ≈ are the foreground operators. As usual, we do not consider additional foreground predicate symbols because they can be encoded as function symbols, e.g., an atom of the form P(t 1 , . . . , t n ) can be encoded as P(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ≈ tt, where tt is a new, otherwise unused, foreground constant. For convenience, however, in examples we will often write the former and mean the latter. Since ≈ will always denotes a congruence relation, we will identify every equational atom s ≈ t with t ≈ s.
Let X F be an infinite set of F-variables, variables of sort F, disjoint with X B , and let X = X B ∪ X F . The calculus takes as input Σ(X )-formulas of a specific form, defined later, and manipulate more generally Σ(X , V ) formulas, i.e., formulas possibly containing rigid variables. We use, possibly with subscripts, the letters {x, y}, {u, v}, {a, b}, and { f , e} to denote respectively regular variables (those in X ), rigid variables, parameters, and foreground function symbols.
To simplify the presentation here, we restrict the return sort of all foreground function symbols to be F . This is a true restriction for non-constant function symbols. 
A foreground term is a term with no operators from Σ Π B . Foreground atoms, literals, and formulas are defined analogously. An ordinary foreground clause is a multiset of foreground literals, usually written as a disjunction. A background term is a (well-sorted) Σ Π B (X B , V )-term. Note that background terms are always B-sorted and vice versa. Foreground terms are made of foreground symbols, variables and rigid variables; they are all F-sorted unless they are rigid variables. A ground term is a term with no variables and no rigid variables. A Herbrand term is a ground term whose only background subterms are background domain elements. Intuitively, Herbrand terms do not contain symbols that need external evaluation, i.e., they contain no parameters, no variables, and no rigid variables. For example, f (e, 1) and 1 are Herbrand terms, but f (v, 1) and f (a, 1) are not.
In this paper, a substitution will be any mapping σ from variables (in X ) to terms that is sort respecting, that is, maps each variable x to a term of the same sort as x. We write substitution application in postfix form and extend the notation to (multi)sets S of terms or formulas in the obvious way, that is, Sσ = {F σ | F ∈ S}. The domain of a substitution σ is the set dom(σ) = {x | x = xσ}. A Herbrand substitution is a substitution that maps every variable to a Herbrand term. We denote by fvar(F ) the set of non-rigid variables that occur free in F , where F is a term or formula.
We assume a reduction ordering that is total on the Herbrand terms. 4 We also require that is stable under assignments, i.e., if s t then sα tα, for every suitable assignment α for s and t. The ordering is extended to literals over Herbrand terms by identifying a positive literal s ≈ t with the multiset {s, t}, a negative literal ¬(s ≈ t) with the multiset {s, s, t, t}, and using the multiset extension of . Multisets of literals are compared by the multiset extension of that ordering, also denoted by .
Semantics. An interpretation I is any Σ-structure augmented to include an injective, possibly partial, mapping from the set V of rigid variables to the domain of B in I. We will be interested primarily in Herbrand interpretations, defined below.
Definition 2.1 (Herbrand interpretations) A (T -based)
Herbrand interpretation is any interpretation I that (i) is identical to T over the symbols of Σ B , (ii) interprets every foreground n-ary function symbol f as itself, i.e., f
of domain elements from the proper domain, and (iii) interprets ≈ as a congruence relation on F-sorted Herbrand terms.
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A (parameter) valuation π is a mapping from Π to |B|. An assignment α is an injective mapping from a (finite or infinite) subset of V to |B|. Since T is fixed, a Herbrand interpretation I is completely characterized by three components: a congruence relation on the Herbrand terms, a valuation π and an assignment α.
An assignment α is suitable for a formula or set of formulas F if its domain includes all the rigid variables occurring in F . Since all the elements of |B| are constants of Σ B we will often treat assignments and valuations similarly to substitutions. For any Herbrand interpretation I, valuation π and assignment α, we denote by I[π] the interpretation that agrees with π on the meaning of the parameters (that is, a I = aπ for all a ∈ Π) and is otherwise identical to I; we denote by I[α] the interpretation that agrees with α on the meaning of the rigid variables in α's domain and is otherwise identical to I. We write
The symbols I, α and π we will always denote respectively Herbrand interpretations, assignments and valuations. Hence, we will often use the symbols directly, without further qualification. We will do the same for other selected symbols introduced later. Also, we will often implicitly assume that α is suitable for the formulas in its context.
Definition 2.2 (Satisfaction of constraints)
Let c be a closed constraint. For all π and all α suitable for c, the pair (π, α) satisfies c, written as (π, α) |= c, if T |= cπα in the standard sense. 6 If α is suitable for a set Γ of closed constraints, (π, α) satisfies Γ, written (π, α) |= Γ,
The set Γ above is satisfiable if (π, α) |= Γ, for some π and α. Since constraints contain no foreground symbols, for any interpretation
Note 2.3 (Deciding the satisfiability of closed constraints)
The satisfiability of arbitrary closed constraints, which may contain rigid variables, reduces in a straightforward way to the satisfiability of Σ B -constraints without rigid variables, and so can be decided by any decision procedure for the latter. In fact, let V Γ be the set of all the rigid variables occurring in a set Γ of closed constraints. Then, Γ is satisfiable iff Distinct(V Γ ) ∪ Γ is satisfiable in T in the usual sense, where all the rigid variables and the parameters of Γ are treated as free variables, and Distinct(
The constraint set Distinct(V Γ ) reflects the injectivity of assignments. This method obviously applies also to finite sets of closed constraints by taking conjunc-
Contexts and Constrained clauses
The calculus maintains two data structures for representing Herbrand interpretations: a foreground context, for the foreground operators, and a background context, for valuations and assignments. The former is a finite set of foreground literals, which we call context literals. The latter is a finite set of closed constraints. A context is a pair Λ · Γ consisting of a foreground context Λ and a background context Γ.
The symbols Λ and Γ will always denote respectively foreground contexts and background contexts, even without further qualification. We identify every foreground context Λ with its closure under renaming of (regular) variables, and assume it contains a pseudoliteral of the form ¬x. A foreground literal K is contradictory with Λ if K ∈ Λ, where K denotes the complement of K. Λ itself is contradictory if it contains a literal that is contradictory with Λ. We will work only with non-contradictory contexts.
For any foreground literals K and L, we write K L iff L is an instance of K, i.e., iff there is a substitution σ such that
Observe that context unifiers treat rigid variables like constants. A context unifier σ can be computed by composing most general unifiers of the literals in C with fresh variants of literals in Λ, one after another, while ignoring the sorts. That σ will be sort-respecting, and hence a substitution in our sense, which follows from the well-sortedness of literals and clauses.
For, if x is a background variable then xσ can only be another background variable or rigid variable (these are the only B-sorted terms in foreground formulas); and if x is a foreground variable, xσ can only be a foreground term occurring in C, possibly further instantiated in the same way. The calculus works with constrained clauses, expressions of the form C ← R·c where R is a multiset of foreground literals, the set of context restrictions, C is an ordinary foreground clause, and c is a (background) constraint with fvar(c) ⊆ fvar(C) ∪ fvar(R). When C is empty we write it as . When R is empty, we write the constraint clause more simply as C ← c. The calculus takes as input only clauses of the latter form, hence we call such clauses input constrained clauses. Below we will often speak of (input) clauses instead of (input) constrained clauses when no confusion can arise.
We can turn any expression of the form C ← c where C is an arbitrary ordinary Σ-clause and c a constraint into an input clause by abstracting out offending subterms from C, moving them to the constraint side of ←, and existentially quantifying variables in the constraint side that do not occur in the clause side. For example,
As will be clear later, this transformation preserves the semantics of the original expression.
The variables of input clauses are implicitly universally quantified. Because the background domain elements (such as, e.g., 0, 1, −1, . . .) are also background constants, we can define the semantics of input clauses in terms of Herbrand interpretations. To do that, we need one auxiliary definitions first.
If γ is a Herbrand substitution and C ← c an input clause, the clause We say that ∆ is satisfiable if some I[α] satisfies F . Let G be an input clause or closed constraint. We say that ∆ entails G, written as ∆ |= G, if for every suitable assignment α for ∆ and G, every interpretation I[α] that satisfies ∆ also satisfies G.
The definition of satisfaction of general constraint clauses C ← R · c, with a non-empty restriction R, is more complex because in our completeness argument for the calculus C is evaluated "semantically", with respect to Herbrand interpretations induced by a context, whereas R is evaluated "syntactically", with respect to productivity in a context. Moreover, certain things cannot be expressed purely at the ground level and require to consider Herbrand closures. Context restrictions are evaluated in terms of productivity by applying an assignment to the involved rigid variables first. To this end, we will use evaluated contexts Λα = {Kα | K ∈ Λ}. By the injectivity of α, the notions above on contexts apply "isomorphically" after evaluation by α. For instance, K produces L in Λ iff Kα produces Lα in Λα.
A set F of literals is non-trivial if no K ∈ F is of the form t ≈ t or ¬(t ≈ t). (ii) for every K ∈ Rα there is an L ∈ Λα that produces both K and Kγ in Λα.
If Point (ii) above holds for some K ∈ Rα, we also say that Λα produces K and Kγ by the same literal. Point (i) is need to avoid trivial equations and to show in the completeness proof why paramodulation into variables is not necessary.
Definition 3.6 (Satisfaction of Herbrand closures)
We will use Definition 3. In our soundness arguments for the calculus a constraint clause C ← R · c will stand for the Σ-formula C ∨ ( L∈R L) ∨ ¬c. We call the latter the clause form of C ← R · c and denote
Core Inference Rules
The calculus works on sequents of the form Λ · Γ Φ, where Λ · Γ is a context and Φ is a set of constrained clauses, all components finite. We write Λ, K · Γ Φ for Λ ∪ {K} · Γ Φ and similarly with Γ and Φ. There are five core inference rules: Pos-Res, Ref, Para, Split and Close.
The first two inference rules perform equality reasoning at the foreground level.
and σ is an mgu of s and t. The clause ¬(s ≈ t) ∨ C ← R · c is the selected clause, and the clause in the conclusion is the derived clause.
The next inference rule is a variant of ordered paramodulation. 
The clause L ∨ C ← R · c is the selected clause, the context literal l ≈ r is the selected context equation, and the new clause in the conclusion is the derived clause.
We can afford to not paramodulate into rigid variables s, as these are B-sorted, and the resulting unifier with (a F-sorted variable) l would be ill-sorted. The equation l ≈ r is added to R to preserve soundness.
If L is a negative equation t 1 [s] ≈ t 2 , the Para rule could be improved by requiring that t 2 σ t 1 σ. That is, paramodulation into smaller sides of negative equations is not necessary.
We could afford a selection function that select zero or more occurrences of negative equations in the component C of a clause C ← R · c. The Ref and Para inference rules then must selected a literal that is among the ones selected by the selection function, if there are any. The rationale for this restriction is that negative equations must be "proven" by making their two sides (syntactically) equal anyway, so this can be done at any time.
If C is an ordinary foreground clause, C denotes the multiset of the complements of the literals in C, i.e. C = {L | L ∈ C}, which is a set of context restrictions.
The next rule turns the ordinary clause part of a constrained clause into context restrictions.
Pos-Res
if Φ contains a clause of the form C ← R · c such that (i) C = and C consists of positive literals only, and (ii) σ is a productive context unifier of C against Λ. The clause C ← R · c is the selected clause, and the new clause in the conclusion is the derived clause.
Note that the derived clause is indeed a constraint clause. The reason is that the literals of C and the context literals used for the unifier σ are all foreground literals. As a consequence, σ replaces foreground variables by foreground terms and background variables by background variables or rigid variables.
For example, if Λ = {¬P(e)}, from
Intuitively, Pos-Res is applied when all literals in the ordinary clause part of a clause have been sufficiently processed by the equality inference rules Para and Ref (including the positive ones) and turns them into context restriction. Deriving an empty constrained clause this way does not make a refutation, though, as the clause could possibly be satisfied, in an interpretation that falsifies its context restriction or falsifies its constraint. The Split rule below analysis this possibility. It takes a constrained empty clause from Φ and splits on one of its context restriction literals, after instantiating all free variables in the constraint (only) by some rigid variables.
It comes with side conditions that treat context literals as constrained clauses. Formally, let Λ (e,n) = {K (e,n) ← | K ∈ Λ} be the clause form of Λ, where K (e,n) is the context literal obtained from K by replacing every foreground variable by a fixed foreground constant e and replacing every background variable by a fixed background domain element n. We say 
← R · c is the selected clause, and the literal K is the split literal.
The set Φ can also be seen to implicitly contain with each clause all its domain instances, and taking one of those as the selected clause for Split. For soundness reasons, background contexts need to be global to derivations. Any conditions added to Γ in the course of a further derivation of the left branch need to be present in the right branch. (See the proof of Theorem 7.1, soundness.) This is modeled by Condition (i v). The branch Γ can be obtained in a constructive way by trying to extend the left branch to a refutation sub-tree, which, if successful, gives the desired Γ . If not successful, no matter if finite or infinite, the input clause set is satisfiable, and the derivation need not return to the right branch anyway.
Observe that if Split is applicable then Close cannot be applied with the same selected clause, as its Condition (i) will not be satisfied.
Model Construction, Redundancy and Static Completeness
In this section we will show how derive from a sequent Λ · Γ Φ an intended interpretation I[Λ, π, α] as a canonical candidate model for Φ. Its components π and α will be determined first by Γ, and its congruence relation will be presented by a convergent ground rewrite system R Λ,α extracted from Λ and α. The general technique for defining R Λ,α is borrowed from the completeness proof of the Superposition calculus [2, 12] and earlier ME calculi [6, 5] . One difference is that ME E (T) requires the construction of a fully reduced rewrite system, whereas for Superposition a left-reduced rewrite system is sufficient.
A rewrite rule is an expression of the form l → r where l and r are F-sorted Herbrand terms. A rewrite system is a set of rewrite rules. The rewrite systems constructed below will be ordered, that is, consist of rules of the form l → r such that l r. For a given Λ and suitable assignment α, we define by induction on the term ordering sets ε K and R K for every ground equation K between F-sorted Herbrand-terms. Assume that ε L has already
Λα produces l ≈ r, l r, and l and r are irreducible wrt R l≈r otherwise
, which although irreducible, is not produced by Λα. The rewrite system R Λ,α is fully reduced by construction (no rule in R Λ,α rewrites any other rule in it). Since is well-founded on the Herbrand terms, R Λ,α is convergent. It follows with well-known results that equality of Herbrand terms in R Λ,α can be decided by reduction to normal form using the rules in R Λ,α .
The rewrite system R Λ,α will also be used to evaluate evaluated context restrictions:
Definition 5.2 (Satisfaction of variable-free foreground literals)
Let R be a set of literals over Herbrand terms. We say that R Λ,α satisfies R, and write R Λ,α |= R, iff
(ii) for every ¬(l ≈ r) ∈ R, l and r are irreducible wrt. R Λ,α .
For example, if Λ = { f (v) ≈ e 2 }, α = {v → 1}, and f (1)
is reducible wrt. R Λ,α , and because e 1 → e 2 is not in R Λ,α .
Our concepts of redundancy require comparing Herbrand closures. To this end, define
Notice that despite constraints are ignored, this ordering is not total, as constrained clauses may contain rigid variables. 
We say that a Herbrand closure γ to C ← R · c, the derived clause, and l ≈ r satisfies all applicability conditions of that inference rule, except (C ← R · c)γ ∈ Φ and (l ≈ r)γ ∈ Λ, we call the resulting ground inference a ground instance via γ (of the given inference). This is not always the case, as, e.g., ordering constraints can become unsatisfiable after application of γ. 
Split (C = ): (a) there is a literal K ∈ R such that Λ does not produce K or (b) the split literal is contradictory with Λ .
Definition 5.5 (Saturated sequent) A sequent Λ · Γ Φ is saturated iff every inference with a core inference rule and premise Λ · Γ Φ is redundant wrt. Λ · Γ Φ.
We note that actually carrying out an inference makes it redundant wrt. the (all) conclusion(s), which already indicates that saturated sequents can be effectively computed.
Our first completeness result holds only for saturated sequents with respect to relevant closures. We say that a clause (C ← R · c, γ) is relevant wrt. Λ and α iff R Λ,α |= Rαγ. All Herbrand closures of input clauses are always relevant. 
∈ R Λ,α , and so P(x) ← P(x) · is not a relevant closure wrt. Λ and α, and so Theorem 5.6 is not violated. Theorem 5.6 applies to a statically given sequent Λ · Γ Φ. The connection to the dynamic derivation process of the ME E (T) calculus will be given later, and Theorem 5.6 will be essential then in proving the completeness of the ME E (T) calculus.
The ME E (T) Calculus
We are now turning to derivation processes for computing saturated sequents. First we introduce two more inference rules. The first one, Simp, is a generic simplification rule.
The first condition is needed for completeness, and the second condition is needed for soundness. For example, if Λ contains a ground literal K, then every constraint clause of the form C ← ({K} ∪ R) · c can be deleted, and every constraint clause of the form C ← ({K} ∪ R) · c can be replaced by C ← R · c. The Simp rule encompasses various additional forms of simplification of the literals in C based on rewriting and subsumption, see [6] .
We only note here that additional (optional) inference rules can be defined for simplifying contexts.
For example, by 10-fold application of restrict one can construct a background context {1 ≤ v 1 ≤ 10, . . . , 1 ≤ v 10 ≤ 10} that represents the numbers 1, . . . , 10 in a "nondeterministic" way. The purpose of Restrict is to construct finitely committed branches, as formally introduced below.
We are now going to introduce derivations in a formal way. Let Ψ is a set of pure input clauses and Γ a satisfiable set of closed constraints. A derivation from Ψ and Γ is a sequence ((N i , E i )) 0≤i<κ of trees of sequents (called derivation trees) with nodes N i and edges E i , such that T 0 consists of the root-only tree whose sequent is ¬v · Γ Ψ, and T i is obtained by one single application of one of the core inference rules, Simp or Restrict to T i−1 , for all
A refutation is a derivation that contains a refutation tree, that is, a derivation tree that contains in each leaf a sequent with ← · in its clauses.
Every derivation determines a possibly infinite limit tree T = ( i<κ N i , i<κ E i ). In the following, let Λ i · Γ i Φ i be the sequent labelling the node i in the branch B with κ nodes of a limit tree T, for all i < κ. Let
• Γ B = i<κ Γ i the limit background context,
• Λ B = i<κ Λ i be the limit foreground context literals, and
The tuple Λ B · Γ B Φ B is called the limit sequent (of B). To prove a completeness result, derivations in ME E (T) need to construct limit sequents with certain properties. One of these properties is expressed in terms of the following closure property: (
While the above notion is similar to the one already used in ME E , ME E (T) has additional requirements on the limit background context Γ B , introduced next. For any background domain element n and assignment α let pre α (n) = {v | α(v)
The set in condition (i) consists of those background domain elements that are represented by some (not neccessarily the same) rigid variable from some point on forever. Condition (i) then says this must be the case for all background domain elements. Condition (ii) then says that only finitely many rigid variables can be used for that. Condition (iii) says, in other words, that no rigid variable occuring in Γ B can be assigned infinitely many values as the context evolves. Similarly in condition (iv) for parameters.
The purpose of Definition 6.2 is to make sure that a valuation π and a suitable assignment α for Γ always exists, and moreover, that (π, α) satisfies Γ B : Proposition 6.3 (Compactness of finitely committed branches) If B is finitely committed then there is a π and an α such that ran(α) = |B| and (π, α) |= Γ B . Proposition 6.3 states a compactness property. By construction, the sequence (Γ i ) i<κ is an non-decreasing chain wrt ⊆ and every Γ i is satisfiable. Proposition 6.3 then takes satisfiability to the limit Γ B .
One might wonder if the lemma is in contradiction to well-known results. Linear integer arithmetic, for instance, is not compact (let d be a rigid variable and take the set {d = n | n is an integer}, every finite subset of which is satisfable). However, the lemma is about sets Γ B with specific properties.
To see one of the issues that Proposition 6.3 addresses consider Γ i = k≤i {v 1 > k} then Γ B is not satisfiable, although every finite subset is satisfiable. But on the other hand condition (iii) in Definition 6.2 is not satisfied.
We only note here with enough Restrict applications finitely committed limit branches can be constructed in a straightforward way if the input clause set is rigid variable-free, which is an unproblematic assumption, and if the input background constraints essentially confine each parameters to a finite domain. In the LIA case, for example, one could "slice" the integers in intervals of, say, 100 elements and enumerate with Restrict declarations like 1 ≤ v 1 ≤ 100, . . . , 1 ≤ v 100 ≤ 100 before any rigid variable v i is used for the first time (in Split), and do that for all intervals. In certain cases it is possible to determine a priori that limit background contexts will be finite, and then Restrict is not required at all, see Section 7.
Definition 6.4 (Fairness)
A derivation is fair iff it is a refutation or its limit tree has an exhausted and finitely committed branch.
The following proposition is instrumental in proving completeness: 
Soundness and Special Cases
Theorem 7.1 (Relative refutational soundness) Let D be a refutation from a set Ψ of input clauses and a satisfiable set Γ of closed constraints.
If T is a refutation tree in D, B the rightmost branch in T, and Γ B the sequent in the leaf of B, then Γ B ⊇ Γ, Γ B is satisfiable, and Γ B ∪ Ψ is not satisfiable.
Typically, the calculus is applied to rigid variable-free input clause sets Ψ. If additionally Ψ is parameter-free, then Ψ is satisfiable or not, independent of parameter valuations and assignments. Theorem 7.1 then reduces to the conclusion that Ψ alone is not satisfiable. However, typically Ψ will contain parameters. Again assuming that Ψ is rigid variable-free, Theorem 7.1 then allows us to conclude
For example, if Ψ = {P(x) ← x = a, ¬P(x) ← x = 5} and Γ = {a > 2} then there is a refutation with Γ B = {a > 2, a = 5}. Of course, Ψ ∪ Γ is satisfiable, cf. Definition 3.3. A soundness result can thus be not based on single refutations, and this is why we call the soundness result above "relative". To obtain the expected soundness result, we work with sequences of refutations whose limit background contexts collectively cover the initially given Γ. In the example, the next derivation starts with Γ = {a > 2, ¬(a = 5)}, which leads to a (finite) derivation that provides the expected model.
Let Ψ be the input clause set and Γ the (rigid variable-free) satisfiable input background constraints. Say that π satisfies ∃Γ if (π, α) |= Γ, for some suitable α. The intuition above leads to the following general procedure: repeat let D be a derivation from Ψ and Γ if D is a refutation then let Γ B be its limit background context if every π that satisfies ∃Γ also satisfies ∃Γ B then stop with "unsatisfiable" else let Γ ⊃ Γ such that some π satisfies ∃Γ but does not satisfy Γ B set Γ = Γ else stop with "satisfiable"
In the LIA case, for example, the limit background contexts can always be made rigidvariable free by quantifier elimination. The set Γ ⊃ Γ can then be computed as Γ = Γ ∪ { c∈Γ B ¬c}, which is the weakest possible such set.
The derivation D in line 1 might not be finite, and hence line 2 might not be reached. In this case the procedure does not terminate, but this is acceptable as by the completeness theorem (Theorem 6.6) Ψ ∪ Γ is satisfiable then. Another source for non-termination comes from growing the sets Γ without bound. This is theoretically acceptable, as our logic is not even semi-decidable. In practice, one could add to Γ finite domain declarations for all parameters involved, like 1 ≤ a ≤ 100. This will obviously lead to finitely many Γ only. Moreover, with the method suggested above, the sets Γ will be computed in a conflict-driven way. For example, if Ψ = {P(x) ← x = a, ¬P(x) ← 1 ≤ x ≤ 100} and Γ = {1 ≤ a ≤ 100} then the procedure above will terminate with "unsatisfiable" in the first round, and the refutation will be found in O(1) time. By contrast, finite-domain finders will essentially, work with the disjunction a = 1 ∨ · · · ∨ a = 100. If Ψ = {P(x) ← x = a, ¬P(x) ← 1 ≤ x ≤ 50} instead, a derivation (non-refutation) will be found in the second round that confines a to 51 ≤ a ≤ 100.
Another special case is when all input clauses are of the form C ← c ∧ x 1 = t 1 ∧ · · · ∧ x n = t n , where c and the t i 's are ground background terms. Because each t i is ground, it cannot be instantiated in Split inferences, and by injectivity of assignments, Split can instantiate each x i only with one single rigid variable, as no (satisfiable) background context can contain v 1 = t and v 2 = t for different v 1 and v 2 . In consequence, the limit background context will always be finite, for any input background context, in particular those without any finite domain declarations for the parameters. Moreover, because the set of background terms is fixed a priori, there are only finitely many non-equivalent background contexts. Therefore, the procedure above cannot grow Γ without bound, and the only source for nontermination is in line 1. One obvius way that guarantees termination for that as well is when the free variables in C are exactly x 1 , . . . , x n . This will lead to ground foreground contexts only, which cannot grow infinitey due to calculus restrictions.
Notice that the clauses of this form are the image of abstraction of formulas of the form C ← c where C is a ground clause and c is a ground constraint. One may even add functionality axioms like e.g., ¬P f (x, y 1 ) ∨ ¬P f (x, y 2 ) ← y 1 = y 2 , where P f encodes a (unary) function symbol f . Adding these axioms does not endanger termination, because they can only be used to close branches, never to introduce fresh rigid variables into a foreground contexts. As a consequence, ME E (T) can be used as a decision procedure for ground problems in the combination of the background theory and uninterpreted function symbols with equality (even B-sorted ones).
Conclusions
We presented the new ME E (T) calculus, which properly generalizes the essentials of two earlier Model Evolution calculi, the ME E calculus with equality inference rules but without theory reasoning [5] , and ME(LIA) [4] , which is the other way round. We expect ME E (T)-based theorem provers to be useful for problems that rely heavily on parameters. In Section 7 we provided some considerations why this is the case. As always, much remains to be done. Among that is extension by "universal variables" and further simplification rules. As said before, we plan to extend the calculus directly with B-sorted (non-constant) function symbols. This could be done along the lines in [3] . Another pressing issue is to strengthen ME E (T)'s model-building capabilities. For example, an input clause like P(x) ← x > 0 leads to nontermination, as, in essence, infinitely many instances P(v i ) ← v i > 0 over rigid variables v 1 , v 2 , . . . are needed to represent the model of P(x) ← x > 0. This is clearly an undesirable situation. But other theorem proving calculi designed for the same logic face the same problem, if not on this example, only slightly more complicated ones will do. This indicates a serious research problem, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
A Proofs
The following lemma establishes an important relation between ground literals produced by Λ and the rewrite system R Λ,α .
Lemma A.1 Let l and r be variable-free foreground terms and α a suitable assignment. If lα rα. Then, (i) if (l → r)α ∈ R Λ,α then Λ produces l ≈ r, and
∈ R Λ,α and lα and rα are irreducible wrt R Λ,α then Λ produces ¬(l ≈ r) and Λ does not produce (l ≈ r).
Proof. By stability of under assignments, l r entails lα rα.
The statement (i) follows immediately from the definition of R Λ,α and the fact that Λ produces a literal K if and only if Λα produces Kα (recall that α is injective).
Concerning (ii), suppose that lα and rα are irreducible wrt. R Λ,α . If Λ produces l ≈ r then Λα produces (l ≈ r)α. We distinguish two cases. If R Λ,α generates (l → r)α then lα is reducible by (l → r)α ∈ R Λ,α . If R Λ,α does not generate (l → r)α then, by definition of R Λ,α , lα or rα must be reducible wrt. (R Λ,α ) (l≈r)α , hence reducible wrt. R Λ,α . Both cases thus contradict the assumption that lα and rα are irreducible wrt. R Λ,α . It follows that Λ does not produce l → r.
Thanks to the presence of the pseudo-literal ¬x in every context, it is not difficult to see that every context produces K or K, for every literal K. Thus, with Λ not producing l ≈ r we can conclude that Λ produces ¬(l ≈ r).
By combining Definition 5.2 and Lemma A.1, we immediately conclude that Λ produces every literal in a variable-free context restriction R if R Λ,α |= Rα. The relevance of this result is that, whenever Rα is satisfied by R Λ,α then the "syntactic" notion of productivity can be used to identify such situations, independent of α, in particular to identify relevant Herbrand closures of clauses C ← R · c that are falsified by an induced interpretation I[Λ, π, α]).
The completeness proof works consistently with relevant constrained clauses. The following result is instrumental in reducing a hypothetical relevant counterexample, one that is falsified in the induced model, to a smaller relevant counterexample that additionally preserves satisfaction of its context restriction. Proof. For convenience we abbreviate R := R Λ,α below. With (i), by relevancy we have R |= Rαγ, i.e., with Definition 5.2, if l ≈ r ∈ Rαγ then l → r ∈ R, and if ¬(l ≈ r) ∈ Rαγ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R. Moreover, (Λ, α) |= (R, γ) means that Rαγ is non-trivial, and for every l ≈ r ∈ Rα, if lγ rγ then l is not a variable, and for every K ∈ Rα, Λ produces K and Kγ by the same literal.
We have to show
(1) R αγ is non-trivial, and for every l ≈ r ∈ R α, if lγ rγ then l is not a variable, (2) for every K ∈ R α, Λ produces K and K γ by the same literal, (3) if l → r ∈ R αγ then l → r ∈ R, and (4) if ¬(l ≈ r) ∈ R αγ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R.
The property (1) is easily obtained from inspection of the inference rules. For the second part it is crucial that paramodulation into variables is forbidden. It remains to show (2), (3) and (4) . Let σ be the unifier as mentioned in case (ii-a) and (ii-b). Assume σ is idempotent, which is the case with usual unification algorithms. Because γ gives a ground instance of the given inference, γ must be a unifier for the same terms as σ. Because σ is a most general unifier, there is a substitution δ such that γ = σδ. With the idempotency of σ we get γ = σδ = σσδ = σγ.
For later use we prove some simple facts:
(i) if K ∈ Rασ then Λ produces K and K γ by the same literals.
Proof: Assume K ∈ Rασ and let K ∈ Rα such that Kσ = K . We already know that some L ∈ Λα produces K in Λα and L produces Kγ in Λα. If L didn't produce Kσ in Λα then there would be a L ∈ Λα with L L Kσ. With γ = σδ and by transitivity of we would get L L Kγ, and so L would not produce Kγ either. Hence L produces Kσ in Λα. Because L produces Kγ in Λα, with Kσ = K and γ = σγ conclude that L produces K γ in Λα, too.
(ii) if l ≈ r ∈ Rασγ then l → r ∈ R.
Proof: we already know that if l → r ∈ Rαγ then l → r ∈ R. The claim then follows immediately with γ = σγ.
(iii) if ¬(l ≈ r) ∈ Rασγ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R.
Proof: we already know that if ¬(l ≈ r) ∈ Rαγ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R. The claim then follows immediately with γ = σγ.
To prove (2), (3) and (4) we carry out a case analysis with respect to the inference rule applied.
In case of a Ref inference let the selected clause be s ≈ t ∨ C ← R · c and the derived clause C ← R · c = (C ← R · c)σ. With R = Rσ, (2) follows directly from fact (i), (3) follows immediately from fact (ii), and (4) follows immediately from fact (iii).
In case of a Para inference let the selected clause be
The proofs of (2), (3) and (4) for the subset Rσ of R follows immediately from facts (i), (ii) and (iii), respectively. Now consider the sole additional element (l ≈ r)σ that is in Γ but not in Rσ. Recall we are given that l ≈ r produces (l ≈ r)ασ in Λα and that l ≈ r produces (l ≈ r) α γ = (l ≈ r) α σγ in Λα, which proves (2). Regarding (3), recall we are given that
The proof for the case of Pos-Res is similar and is omitted.
The ordering has already been extended to closures. For the purposes of the completeness proof, we work with evaluated closures, i.e., closures with some fixed assignment α applied to them. To this end, we introduce for any assignment α the parametrized ordering α as s α t iff sα tα. Notice that α is total and well-founded on any set of variable-free foreground terms that α is suitable for, because α maps such terms to Herbrand terms, and is well-founded and total on Herbrand terms.
Because is stable under assignments (by definition) it follows α if , for any Herbrand closures and . Furthermore, with the remarks above, α is total and well-founded for any set of Herbrand closures that α is suitable for.
Definition A.3 (Smaller Relevant
Closures from Φ wrt. Λ and α) Let Φ be a set of clauses, Λ a context, α an assignment, and a Herbrand closure. Define
is a relevant closure wrt. Λ and α}, and
In words, Φ Λ,α is the set of relevant closures wrt. Λ and α of all clauses from Φ that, when evaluated under α, are all smaller wrt. than evaluated under α.
is a relevant closure wrt. Λ and α, and (iii) 
Proof. Assume (i), (ii) and (iii). We have to show
is smaller wrt. than , and also smaller wrt. α than by stability of under assignments. More formally, thus,
, and with (iii) conclude
Because α is injective it can be seen as a renaming of the rigid variables in these clauses into background domain elements, i.e, constants from a disjoint domain. Therefore {C 1 γ 1 α, . . . , C n γ n α} |= Cγα, and so R Λ,α |= Cγα. Again by induced interpretation
In Proof. Suppose (π, α) |= Γ, ran(α) = |B| and ( ← · ) / ∈ Φ. For the proof of the first statement we show the following property (P):
Once (P) is shown, the "moreover" statement follows easily from the (trivial) facts that for clauses with empty context restrictions every Herbrand instance is trivially relevant and
We prove (P) by contradiction. Every counterexample, that is, every closure (C ← R·c, γ) of a clause C ← R · c ∈ Φ that is relevant wrt. Λ and α and that does not satisfy (P) must satisfy the following properties:
(ii) (Λ, α) |= (R, γ), and . We carry out an exhaustive case analysis on properties of (C ← R · c, γ).
there, (P) follows immediately, contradicting our assumption. Hence, (C ← R · c, γ) cannot be redundant wrt. Λ · Γ Φ.
(2) var(C)αγ is reducible wrt. R Λ,α . The ME E (T) calculus does not paramodulate into or below variables. To explain the completeness of this restriction we need to know that var(C)αγ is irreducible wrt. R Λ,α .
First we show that every term t ∈ (var(C) ∩ var(R))αγ is irreducible wrt. R Λ,α . For, if t is reducible wrt. R Λ,α and occurs in a negative literal ¬(l ≈ r) ∈ R α γ then we get a contradiction to (i), as that negative literal is reducible wrt. R Λ,α . If t occurs in a positive literal l ≈ r ∈ Rαγ we conclude as follows: from (i) it follows l = r and hence, w.l.o.g, l r. As l ≈ r ∈ Rαγ there is a l ≈ r ∈ Rα such that (l ≈ r )γ = l ≈ r. By Definition 3.5-(i), l is not a variable. Hence, t occurs as a subterm of r or as a proper subterm of l. But then l → r is reducible by a smaller rule from R Λ,α , and hence l → r cannot be generated in R Λ,α , again contradicting (i).
If xαγ is reducible for some x ∈ var(C) \ var(R), then a term in the range of γα can be replaced by a smaller yet congruent term wrt. R Λ,α . Observe that this results in a smaller (wrt. α ) counterexample, thus contradicting the choice of (C ← R · c, γ).
In summary, thus, var(C)αγ is irreducible wrt. R Λ,α , which we may assume from now on.
Suppose that none of the preceding cases holds and C = s ≈ t ∨ D. With Lemma A.1-(i) it follows that Λ produces l ≈ r. For later use let l ≈ r ∈ Λ be a fresh variant that produces l ≈ r in Λ and assume that γ has already been extended so that (l ≈ r )γ = l ≈ r.
The conclusions so far give that Para is applicable with selected context equation
The next step is to show that this inference is a ground instance via γ of a Para inference with selected context equation
where σ is an mgu of l and u. The position p in sγ cannot be at or below a variable position in s, because otherwise we had xγ[l γ] p for some variable x occuring in s, and so x α γ would be reducible by (l → r )αγ = (l → r)α, which is impossible by case (2) above. Hence, the position p exists in s, and the term u at that position is not a variable. Then it follows easily that the mgu σ of l and u exists. Furthermore, the rules in R Λ,α are all between F-sorted Herbrand terms, and it follows that l (and r ) are F-sorted, and hence u cannot be a rigid variable, as rigid variables and F-sorted terms are syntactically different, and hence do not unify. Finally, as all rules in R Λ,a are ordered wrt. , from (l → r)α ∈ R Λ,α it follows r σ l σ. Alltogether, we have established now that the claimed Para inference exists.
It is safe to assume that σ is idempotent, which gives us σγ = γ. 
However, by (iv) the first case is impossible. In the second case, with (l → r )αγ ∈ R Λ,α by congruence and σγ = γ it follows R Λ,α |= (s ≈ t ∨ D)αγ. Using C = s ≈ t ∨ D this is a plain contradiction to (v) above.
Suppose that none of the previous cases applies. This entails that C cannot contain a negative literal. In case (4) we examine the case that C is not empty, i.e., that C consists of positive literals only, at least one.
, s α γ = t α γ and hence also sγ = tγ is impossible. Hence assume sγ = tγ in the following. We distinguish two further cases. The rest of the proof uses the same arguments as in case (3.2) and is omitted (we just note that (C ← R · c)γ α ( ← (R ∪ C) · c)γ and hence the latter clause is satisfied in I[Λ, π, α] by induction, which will again lead to a contradiction to (v)).
Suppose C = . First we are going to show that Split is applicable to Λ · Γ Φ with selected clause ← R · c.
With property (ii) above, Λα produces every literal in Rα and every literal in Rαγ . More precisely, for every K ∈ Rα there is a L ∈ Λα that produces K in Λα (and that produces Kγ in Λα). As said earlier, from properties of assignments it follows that L produces K in Λ (and that produces Kγ in Λ) , where K ∈ R such that Kα = K and L ∈ Λ such that Lα = L (*).
If Close were applicable with selected clause ← R · c, then, by saturation, this Close inference is redundant, which is the case only if ← · ∈ Φ. However, we are given that ← · / ∈ Φ, and hence Close is not applicable. Together with (π, α) |= Γ, as given, and (iv) it follows that Γ ∪ {c} is satisfiable, and therefore R ⊆ Λ. Thus, there is a literal K ∈ R such that K / ∈ R. In other words, K is not contradictory with Λ.
In order to show that Split is applicable we need to show, additionally, that K is not contradictory with Λ. For, if it were, this means that K ∈ Λ, and then Λ produces K. But, as all derived contexts are not contradictory, Λ cannot produce K then, plainly contradicting (*) above. Notice that the background context Γ required for the right conclusion of Split exists trivially, as a consequence of condition (4), albeit not in a constructive way.
Thus, at this stage we know that Split is applicable with selected clause ← R · c and split literal K. By redundancy then, (a) there is a literal L ∈ R such that Λ does not produce L in Λ, or (b) K is contradictory with Λ. The case (a) plainly contradicts (*), and case (b) plainly contradicts an earlier conclusion that K is not contradictory with Λ. Proof. It is obvious from Def. 5.3 that a clause that is redundant wrt. Λ · Γ Φ remains redundant if a closed constraint is added to Γ (by monotonicity of first-order logic) or an arbitrary clause is added to Φ, if a non-contradictory literal is added to Λ one needs to prove that, in terms of Def. 5.3, (C ← R · c, γ) remains redundant wrt. Λ · Γ Φ and . This is straightforward to check.
To prove that a clause that is redundant wrt. Λ · Γ Φ remains redundant if redundant clauses are deleted from Φ, it suffices to show that the clauses C i ← R i · c i ∈ Φ in Definition 5.3 can always be chosen in such a way that they are not themselves redundant or their deletion does not affect redundancy of C ← R · c: 
If case (a) in Definition 5.3 applies to ( Proof. The non-trivial case is, in terms of Definition 5.4, to show that (C ← R ·c , γ) remains redundant under the stated modifications of Λ · Γ Φ. This is shown analogously to the proof of Lemma A.7.
Proof. As a convenience, we denote the union of all clauses of a branch B by Φ Proof. Analogously to the proof of Lemma A.9 using Lemma A.8.
Proposition 6.5 (Exhausted Branches are Saturated)
If B is an exhausted branch of a limit tree of a fair derivation then Λ B · Γ B Φ B is saturated.
Proof. Suppose B is an exhausted branch of a limit tree of some fair derivation. We have to show that every ME E (T) inference with a core inference rule and premise Λ B · Γ B Φ B is redundant wrt. Λ B · Γ B Φ B . We do this by assuming such an inference and carrying out a case analysis wrt. the inference rule applied.
By Definition 6.1 there is no Close inference with premise Λ i · Γ i Φ i , for no i < κ, with a persistent selected clause. But then there is no Close inference with premise Λ B · Γ B Φ B either. (Because if so, for a large enough i there would be Close inference with premise
Φ i , which we excluded.) Thus there is nothing to show for Close. If the inference rule is Split then let ← R · c be the selected clause. There are only finitely many literals L, modulo renaming and modulo sign, that are more general wrt. the instantiation preorder than a given literal K. The applicability conditions of the Split inference rule, the only rule that can add literals to foreground contexts, makes sure that from some time k onwards, no more such literal L will be added to Λ k , Λ k+1 , . . .. Suppose k is chosen large enough so that this is the case for all literals K ∈ R.
We are given that ← R·c is persistent. Therefore suppose also ← R·c ∈ Φ k , Φ k+1 , . . ., or choose k big enough. Together this shows that every Split inference with premise Λ B ·Γ B Φ B already exists with with premise Λ k · Γ k Φ k and same selected clause, and vice versa.
Recall from the definition of Split that Λ k must produce every literal in R. By Definition 6.1, the Split inference is redundant wrt. Λ j · Γ j Φ j , for some j < κ with j ≥ k. By redundancy, the selected clause ← R · c is redundant wrt. Λ j · Γ j Φ j , and, with Lemma A.9, redundant wrt. Λ B · Γ B Φ B . Or, (a) there is a literal K ∈ R such that Λ j does not produce K or (b) the split literal is contradictory with Λ j . The case (a) is impossible because from time k onwards no more general literal than K (modulo sign) is added to Λ k , and so Λ j cannot contain a literal that would prevent Λ j from producing K as well. In case Take an arbitrary background domain element n ∈ |B|. By Definition 6.2-(ii), the set pre(n) := i<κ pre α i (n) is finite (it is the set of rigid variables that represent n in the α i 's). Moreover, with Definition 6.2-(i) it follows there is an i such that for all j ≥ i there is a v ∈ pre(n) such that α j (v) = n (*).
Consider an arbitrary rigid variable v that occurs in Γ B . By Definition 6.2-(iii), the set img(v) := i<κ img α i (v) is finite (it is the set of background domain elements that v is mapped to in the α i 's). Because v occurs in Γ B and because background contexts grow monotonically, there is an i such that for all j ≥ i, v occurs in Γ i . Together, thus, there is an i such that for all j ≥ i it holds that α j (v) ∈ img(v) (**).
Consider an arbitrary parameter a that occurs in Γ B . By Definition 6.2-(iv), the set img(a) := i<κ img π i (a) is finite. Because a occurs in Γ B and because background contexts grow monotonically, there is an i such that for all j ≥ i, a occurs in Γ i . Together, thus, there is an i such that for all j ≥ i it holds that π j (a) ∈ img(a) (***).
Observe that for (*), (**) and (***) the same start index i can be chosen.
The next step is to define the desired valuation π and assignment α. Let K = {1, 2, . . .} be an index set consisting initially of all natural numbers. We consider sequences (Γ i ) i∈K and their associated valuations π i and assignments α i . Below we describe how to "thin out" K by iteratively taking subsets of K, which will provide π after finitely many steps, and α in the limit.
The first step is to fix π this way. Let A be the set of parameters that occurs in Γ B and initially K = {1, 2, . . .}. For a given a ∈ A there is an infinite subset {k 1 , k 2 , . . .} ⊆ K, a thinning of K, such that k 1 , k 2 , . . . ≥ i and such that n = π k 1 (a) = π k 2 (a) = · · · , for some n ∈ img(a). Such a thinning and must exist by (***) (recall that img(a) is finite, but there are infinitely many indices k ∈ K with k ≥ i, and so among all these valuations α k there must be infinitely many that map a to n.)
As input clause sets are finite and there are no inference rules that introduce parameters, the set A is finite. This allows us to iterate the procedure just describe for all parameters in A. The result will be an infinite subset K A of K such that π k 1 (a) = π k 2 (a) = · · · for all a ∈ A where K A = {k 1 , k 2 , . . .}. Let π be any valuation that extends π k 1 to the paramaters not in A.
The next step is to determine α, starting with K A . This is done by simultaneously taking a domain element from |B| and a rigid variable that occurs in Γ B , one pair after the other, and chosing rigid variables to represent the elements from |B|, and chosing background domain elements to map the rigid variables from Γ B to. These choices are guided by the satisfying assignments (π i , α i ) for Γ i , where i is taken from the current index set K, initially K A . After each such choice, K is "thinned out" by keeping only those (infinitely many) indices that enforce compatibility of all subsequent choices with the current choice.
Let K = K A now. For a given n ∈ |B| there is an infinite subset {k 1 , k 2 , . . .} ⊆ K such that k 1 , k 2 , . . . ≥ i and such that n = α k 1 (v) = α k 2 (v) = · · · , for some v ∈ pre(n) (****). Such a set {k 1 , k 2 , . . .} and a rigid variable v must exist by (*) (recall that pre(n) is finite, but there are infinitely many indices k ∈ K with k ≥ i, and so among these assignments α k there must be infinitely many that map some element v ∈ pre(n) to n).
Let V be the set of rigid variables that occurs in Γ B . For a given v ∈ V there is an infinite subset {k 1 , k 2 , . . .} ⊆ K such that k 1 , k 2 , . . . ≥ i and such that n = α k 1 (v) = α k 2 (v) = · · · , for some n ∈ img(v) (*****). The arguments are similar as above, this time using (**) instead of (*).
For a given v and n selected either way, we refer to the set {k 1 , k 2 , . . .} as a thinning of K to (v, n).
We are now ready to describe a procedure that yields, in the limit, the desired assignment α. It proceeds as follows.
Set N := |B| Set K := {1, 2, . . .} Set D := {v | v is a rigid variable that occurs in Γ B } loop:
Chose some n ∈ N Let K n be a thinning of K to (v , n), for some v ∈ pre(n) Set N := N \ {n}, V := V \ {v }, and K := K n Chose some v ∈ V tree. Let B be any exhausted and finitely committed branch of T, and Λ B · Γ B Φ B the limit sequent of B.
Let π be a valuation and α a suitable assignment for Γ B with ran(α) = |B| such that (π, α) |= Γ B , which exist by Proposition 6. Proof. Suppose T is not a refutation tree and let B an exhausted branch of T. By Proposition 6.5 the limit sequent Λ B · Γ B Φ B is saturated. By Theorem 5.6 we get the first conclusion immediately.
For the "moreover" part, let C ← c be any clause from Ψ. If C ← c ∈ Φ B then with the second part of Theorem 5.6 nothing remains to be shown. Otherwise C ← c / ∈ Φ B . Hence C ← c has been removed at some time k < κ from the clause set Φ k of the sequent the inference rules, satisfiability of background contexts is preserved for every background
